tv Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan CSPAN January 20, 2014 12:35am-1:48am EST
36%. up that is over a one third increase in one year. second, the taliban continues to finance terrorist activity through drug trade. estimates suggest that the taliban receives $150 million a year in narcotics-related activities. a significant portion of its estimated budget. a 2012 afghane, king -- drug kingpin was sentenced to life in prison in united states on drug trafficking and narco terrorism charges. according to the department of justice, he used some of his drug proceeds to provide cash and arms to the taliban
government. to tell then commanders were responsible for the insurgency activity in eastern afghanistan. the senate caucus on international mark onyx control released a report on this country and argued that the taliban's financial involvement poses a threat to our national security. today thanless true it was three and a half years ago. is 1.6d not least, there million opium addicts in that country. that is over five percent of the population. in advance of the hearing, we have provided our witnesses with draft recommendations on how we can sustain and improve our counter narcotics efforts in this country and in the coming
years. i would like to highlight just a few of them. the purpose for doing this is that we would like to hear what you think will work and will not work. first, as our funding declines, we need to internationalize our narcotics efforts in afghanistan. crimefice of drugs and estimates that russia may be the largest consumer of heroine in the world with 1.7 ops users. the united states and russia should work together much more closely. we should encourage other countries to contribute to these efforts. .ran has a major impact it is my understanding that border patrol agents from iran have been killed in trying to enforce the iranian border.
there may be many areas of disagreement that we have with iran. this is one area where we should agree and counter narcotics is that area. second, i have been very supportive of the programs that are an integrated approach in andinating the cultivation alternative development of public information campaigns and drug demands reduction. meetinge privilege of with the president
. me must also look at non-far income. so, our suggestion is that a greater focus be placed on manufacturing and micro-lending. third, the dea has provided key support to afghan-led units that target drug kingpin's and the drug trade. funding in afghanistan should continue to support these units. i very much welcome the witnesses here today.
mr. brownfield, you have been here before and it is good to see you. at the appropriate time, i will -- ther the sing which distinguished gentleman to make his remarks and then be the first one to ask questions. we can work together on these and i intend to do that. >> thank you very much. >> we can work together on that. on holding this hearing that follows up on two previous hearings on afghan counter-narcotics programs. this discussion is especially timely because of the drawdown
of our troops this year and it has a significant impact on these programs. the hearing gives us an opportunity to hear from the administration about the future of these programs going forward and our efforts in these areas are dependent on the security that our military provides. therefore, i have long been concerned that if our troops are withdrawn completely from afghanistan and if it is too abrupt and without central planning, united states could lose the progress that it has made against the drug trade. feinstein and i theased a report regarding counter-narcotics strategy in afghanistan and, in that report we recommended that the key agencies involved in counter narcotics devise a copperhead to strategy to continue operational effectiveness. time of our hearing, the
obama administration was reducing the number of troops there and i raised concerns then that we could lose our affective -- effectiveness in reducing our presence. we are arty seeing that. i will skip over the statistics that i have because the chairman has already refer to those. toitionally, the failure finalize a bilateral security agreement with the afghans is landing our ability to future counter-narcotics efforts . as we saw in iraq, the country descends into chaos. we should not forget why we are in afghanistan in the first place. we are dealing with a mix of
corruption, organized crime, to leadity, that helped to the rise of the taliban. the taliban provided a safe haven for al qaeda during the september 11 attacks. the counter narcotics efforts in theynistan in short that cannot use the country as a base to threaten our country. we reduce the number of troops in afghanistan and we need to focus on our efforts to build .he capabilities we also need to ensure that law enforcement agencies will still be allowed to work alongside afghan personnel to conduct operations and investigations. we should also prioritize our efforts and combat the money
laundering and narcotics that are exported from afghanistan. in 2012, the estimated value of almost $2s was billion. it is quite obvious that these ands support the insurgency criminal terrorist activities. critical that plans are in place to deal with how our counter narcotics efforts continue to deal, absent security provided by the united states military. in a report, i strongly encouraged this administration comprehensive and workable strategies to do so. i look forward to this hearing from our witnesses today that
regards the counter-nikon explants. narcotics plans. we will place an emphasis on those concerns as we reduce our book print. also interested in what is working and what is not working in our efforts. >> thank you very much. i would like to introduce the witnesses and tell you how grateful we are that you are here. it is really important and we have done to prior reports. we will stick with the subject. i am very worried about where this thing goes and what happens. so, to me introduce our witnesses. on my left is ambassador william brownfield. i welcome him back to our caucus and he has been here before. ambassador brownfield is the assistant secretary of state for international mark onyx and law
enforcement affairs. he has previously served as the united states ambassador to colombia. to welcomeld like james. he is the chief of operations. as the chief, he was the principal advisor. dheart.e lynn she was appointed as the chief of operations in august and has served with the dea for 25 years. thank you so much. priests to have -- pleased to have a written logan. -- aaron logan. as the principal director, she is responsible for the oversight of the defense department.
the management of department policy for terrorist threats and finance. previously worked for joe biden on the foreign relations committee. last and not least, i want to welcome john. he is the special ig for afghan reconstruction. he conducted oversight on the effectiveness of u.s. assistance 20afghanistan and has over years of experience serving on staff in the senate and the house. he has worked as a state and federal prosecutor for investigations and prosecutions against organized crime groups. , wehis distinguished lady are happy to have you here. will you proceed with your questions.
>> permission granted. >> afghanistan is the source of 80% of the illegal opiates. strategy fordrug the future, there are cure -- clear facts that we do not know. we do not know the security structure we will face after 2014 or the contours of the bilateral relationship. or, the resources that will be available to us. we have learned from lessons in the past 40 years of drug programs that are applicable to the entire world. drug strategies take time and it takes years to get into these crises and get out of them. drug strategies must be comprehensive and you cannot solve a crisis addressing just one single element. drug strategies must be
adaptable and capable of responding to inevitable changes by the trafficking adversaries. with an eye on new realities in recentlyan, the bureau reviewed from grams that operates under the agency in afghanistan that was approved in december of 2012. we concluded that our drug program should be driven by five guiding principles. first, focus efforts on sustainable afghan capabilities. is more building important than of equipment and must be sustainable over the long term. second, emphasized afghan priorities and strategies in our planning. if there is no buy-in, the strategy will not succeed. third, deliver on previous commitments. thee lose the thrust of
afghan people, who operation will weather. we th -- cooperation will ither. fifth and finally, given the changing security and resource reality after 2014, we must adjust our monitoring and evaluation strategies to ensure taxpayer funds are protected and programs are as effective as they possibly can be. senators, you will find a programs inout afghanistan. you will read programs that are designed to address crop control and training and capacity building. you will read of some of our efforts to engage in important international partners in the u.n. and u.k..
read of our proposed approach to monitoring and used then where we best available sources to evaluate sources in the field in the light of security and resources. i hope that you will find the outline of the comprehensive drug strategy. i read the media like everyone hasidism inetect reporting that i do not share any more that i share the pessimism of those who reported that columbia was a failure. i do not promise you a successful resolution of the counter narcotics challenge this year or next year. that, with your support, a sustainable and adaptable counter narcotics program that builds capacities
for the afghan government to address drug challenges in the .ost 2014 era i thank you and i look for to your questions. >> thank you. thank you. and very honored to be here i offer my written statement for the record. i asked that it be submitted. man --inguished distinguished members of the panel, on behalf of the dea, i appreciate your opportunity to report on the counter narcotics strategy in afghanistan. the core mission is to disrupt and dismantle one of the most drug trafficking administrations in the united states. the program afghanistan is designed to deny narcotics-
related funding and conducting bilateral investigations. we promote the rule of law and reduce corruption while diminishing threats from afghanistan. tradeternational drug generates 322 billion a year and makes drugs the most lucrative illicit activity. u.n., armso the are smallg, aliens -- by comparison. it enables corruption and roads government legitimacy. stability,s security, and the rule of law in afghanistan and around the region. millionsan receives
from narcotics-related activities. involved inis taxing opium, operating processing lines, moving narcotics through taliban checkpoints and taliban- controlled regions. they provide drug labs and bazaars to collect donations. as the poppy that cultivation expands, it can be that the taliban's will rise. supportive in a drug control strategy. this strategy reaffirms the commitment to afghanistan and breaking the insurgency to reinforce.
the dea's efforts will rain focused on the programs. they are effective. we understand the challenges. the dea will transition our operational profile to correspond with traditional dea operations. we will conduct bilateral investigations that will target trafficking organizations and advise nation law enforcement units to coordinate intelligence and support domestic dea investigations. to meet this commitment, the dea must maintain a sufficient staffing level in afghanistan. we continue to develop our capacities. we will address the illicit drug trade independently by multinationalplex narcotics investigations with
increasing degrees of responsibility and ownership, which they have started doing. reinforce this. the threat from the drug trade is far from over and it is theical that we sustain security gains over the last decade. the dea is committed to standing with our colleagues and counterparts to build a sustainable program in afghanistan that protects national security interests. i thank you for your time and i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you very much. cochair grassley , on behalf of the department of defense, i am particularly pleased to be here. i spent so much of my career here and, quite frankly to have
the opportunity with my distinguished colleagues that i work so closely with on a daily basis. i have a written statement to be included in the record and i would like to take a few minutes to highlight some of the themes. these are the recommendations that you were kind enough to share last week. >> as people well know, since 2001, the united states made an extraordinary investment in blood and treasure to fight in afghanistan. hundreds of thousands of afghanistan's have lost their lives during operation enduring freedom. billionhas invested 2 in training and programs. spent united states has billions on this war. we say that $2 billion has been well spent and we have a seed that has sprouted.
happen ifh will only we protect what as we look to the future, it is impossible to envision success without capability to stop the violence and corruption. we cannot ignore the growing threat to ourselves and allies. our canadian partners estimate that 90% of the heroin comes from afghanistan. they believe they are seeing more on their streets. we must all absorb information like this when combined with the governor delivering a speech problem.n vermont's we must be vigilant about the possibility of afghan produced heroine becoming available across the u.s. because of global trade lowering -- lowering the price. we are committed to disrupting the drugs as far away from our
shores as possible. our strategy in afghanistan can be summarized by saying we are phones in three areas. continue capacity building and continue leveraging of international capabilities. shown that they are willing and able to do the ablend more and more are to plan and execute and follow through on their own. just a couple of weeks ago, the dod supported and the dea men toward the investigative unit -- unitred the investigative that led to not only the rest of criminals but the seizure of harold when -- heroin. and rocket grenades. that is an incredible success story. a unit that dea mentored.
theinuing to support building of capability. i cannot overstate how vital we believe this is. for any security efforts into running effective operation, afghan forces must have adequate mobility to ensure the safety in remote areas where insurgents operate. my office has been focused on special -- to completely plan and execute without international assistance. to have the at craft necessary for vital operations to continue said, ournd that experiences have shown it could take a decade or more to become sustaining. in a nation like afghanistan where pressures will be high, it could take longer. we do believe with support, we are very confident that we can
make progress. i would be amiss if i did not point out that it is part of a -- the u.s. supported justice system has shown it can ask the additional sleep process high-level -- ask the additional sleep process high-level cases. usly process high- level cases. that is a huge success story for them in terms of culture and chances of revenue. the police continue to make progress for the partner. we have seen solid returns. the coronation center. as our strategy highlighted, we believe as we draw down, we need to explore ways that we have
been able to develop with the partners. starting small, we believe we support a regional hub. toronto had seven seizures in 2013. the percentage removed from the high seas is equal to the amount of funding necessary for a post -- for a platoon of insurgents. it will allow us to retain valuable relationships to ability and expand our
and it would require us to work across will believe that is essential. finally, i would give you a few thoughts on your recommendation. of -- it hasea merit. the russians have not been willing to do more than describes a problem of drugs and who must be realistic and our expectations and continue to work with it down. and it isore efforts sometimes complicated by the perception. we also experienced some difficulties implementing capacity building programs is on the internal structure, human and thessues, susceptibility of many to the corruption stop -- corruption.
i would caution the caucus i've not experienced the wilderness to date. recommendation, signs of success. as you point out, we need to make sure we tailored those lessons to lead to different needs and regions. we cannot rely on one-size-fits- all. supported the dea, we wholeheartedly agree. recommendation, again, that is something we would support and recognize the difficulty of doing that without a sense of how our afghan partners will be. processing labs. this a good approach. as you can imagine, on the seventh recommendation, we do not agree. we have a planet to purchase
we doonal at craft, -- not have a plan to purchase additional aircraft. -- inf these activities terms of my colleagues, beside the purchase of the aircraft which has occurred, we have tried to remedy and we found the reports very helpful as confirmed by us that the critical next steps are the ones we agree with. ithave done that and believe is capable and vital to effective units. on your final recommendation to maintain afghanistan, we would agree that we need to maintain capabilities. what caution that some of the critical members of the cell may have difficulty continuing. again, we believe the fight against narcotics networks is
vital and an important component of making sure we honor the sacrifices we have already made. and to protect populations globally but also from the corruption and violence these networks bring. our adversaries make good use to hurt u.s. interests. we must be committed to counter these threats with our own networks with capable partners at home and overseas. with the the vital piece are in place and going forward if we can do the three things, we think we have a chance of preserving where we are. i thank you again. >> thank you, mrs. logan. and your remarks, we put up this constricts your inspector general's activities of being able to evaluate american aid and projects. could you comment on that? >> senator feinstein, cochairman
gracilis -- grassley, thank you for the opportunity to testify. , at your request on my most recent trip to afghanistan, i met with numerous officials involved in the counter narcotics programs. in the opinion of him as every body situation is dire with little prospect for improvement. this year or beyond even with the signing of a bilateral security agreement. what i learned is echoed in the latest reports. the report where they note and find that overall insurgent funding from narcotics trafficking remained largely unchanged. the taliban had shown a greater propensity to protect the poppy harvest and regulate narcotics trafficking.
that international law enforcement officers no longer had the same freedom of movement than in previous reports. those are the areas that anyone under chief status including the circumstancest cannot go beyond the areas because they have to return with that and our. -- within an hour. that basically eliminates the gao and anybody under the chief admission at the dod. the drug targets have a lower priority than traditional military targets. with their ability to quickly networks aretics, likely to continue to function. dod reported that the net result is a drop in the amount of drugs inside of afghanistan. they also noted the 2012
governor let program has failed to show its utility and may insurgentncrease funding in certain areas. as part of our quarterly report, or real last few months, the department of defense has reported to my staff that number support,ut military dea operations will center on expandith little to beyond the capital. that capital forces the ability to conduct contradictions will also be affected by the military. ofharp decline in the amount illicit narcotics seized from fiscal year 2011-2013. going from 98,000 kilograms to 41,000 kilograms.
dod reported to my staff that the interdiction of chemicals dropped 73% between fiscal year 12 and 13. drugotal number of counter operations in afghanistan declined by 26% between fiscal year 12 and 13. most troubling, dod reported to my staff as part of it, when combat operations conclude at led end of 2014, the nato- training advisory commission in afghanistan will not have the resources and capacity to support a law enforcement drug missions at current levels. chairman, why should we be concerned about the situation? even though little of the opium hit american shores, we know the narcotics crisis in afghanistan
is a national security concern. it distorts the afghan economy and poisons is banking sector economys and illicit and undermines the legitimacy of the government by stoking corruption, nursing criminal toworks and providing 30% the taliban and other insurgent groups. it also puts at risk the fragile reconstruction gains we have made over the last 12 years whether in health, education, women's rights. despite the growing threat of the criminal nexus, the united states and other western donors have by and large made counter narcotics a lower strategic priority. equally troubling during my last trip, nobody at our embassy explain howce
despite the strategy, but how the u.s. and coalition efforts are making a meaningful impact on narcotics now. you only have to look at the assisted six foot -- statistics. hopefully, so my colleagues can explain that to you today. i was told on my latest trip that in the transition process for our counter narcotics efforts conducted by the embassy in kabul up to november at the least, had been driven more by thanrs, personnel numbers by a thoughtful, collaborative enter agency analysis of our programs based upon what worked and did not work. i was warned in the area of law enforcement and money this was
significant. the afghan drug problem is growing and threatens to undermine the overall u.s. mission to build a stable afghanistan able to defend itself and prevent terrorist groups from establishing sanctuaries and. programs and afghan think we will, every have invested in both the lives and treasure will be at risk. thank you very much. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. senator grassley? >> i think you for the pooch of going -- privilege of going ahead. , myy opening statement question was to brownfield. i talked about the bilateral security agreement not going through. it was reported the administration believes it is
unlikely an agreement it will be signed before april. my question is if the administration is not able to reach an agreement until april or at all, how would those scenarios affect u.s. counter merck audit efforts -- narcotic efforts and have there been a plans for those scenarios? >> a fair question. a question where i wish i had the answer for you in terms of cs.t is going to happen on ab ouruld suggest to you that for the gentlemen and lady seated to my left, our -- madamility chairman, i was born in the
order in which they were seated. i do not wish to leave any confusion that i thought mr. suggesteda lady and i lady and gentleman to my left. >> we know he can blush. >> my apologies for any conclude -- my apologies. it is our responsibility to develop a strategy and approach that can work in some way regardless of what happens to a bsa. sayo you know service if we we cannot do anything or plan anything or propose anything or have a program onto have an answer to that question. my believe is what we need to do and in fact what we are doing is developing programs that will address all of the core elements that are necessary that we have
learned over the past 30 years are necessary for successful program. something that deals with control and what is being produced in the field. that deals with the production of the actual drug. that does interdiction and covers money-laundering and has sufficient flexibility built into it that we can adjust up or down, move it around the country as required, and respond to the resources made available. the answer i can give you. >> can i conclude you do not have a specific program or scenario on paper right now but you feel there's enough there that you would put into place in case you do not have that military agreement? >> the way i would answer is to say i believe and i hope we have a strategy and a program that is
sufficiently flexible and adaptable that we could add just depending upon not just with the bsa, the results of the next election commitment of that government and political will of the afghan people. the support by the rest of the international community and though those are variables that we do not know the answer. >> something related. it playsnderstanding important role it would've your investigations and to save taxpayers millions of dollars. to make a clear, what could you tell me about that investigation? >> i am happy to do that, senator. citizen soldiers and the epitomize the soldiers of the guard.
they came to our attention. one of them is lieutenant government -- governor goldman. mayor ofbecus is the the city of university park, iowa. a science teacher at the local high school. when the sergeant and the responsibility of handling fuel and they took over from another doesas sergeant said this not make sense. i know something about stores of fuel from my work as a mayor and we are missing feel. hishort order, he went to boss and they did some figuring and found out there were hundreds of thousands of gallons stolen from the military. they did not know what to do.
we have a law enforcement agencies throughout afghanistan and they heard about us. they came to us and we worked on it. they helped save millions of dollars to the american taxpayers. i gave them an award. for their excellent work. this what individuals can do to make a difference on fraud. >> another question. your written testimony. you were somewhat critical of the administration's efforts on counter narcotics in that country. you wrote the united states is not currently have a strategy to combat merck collects -- narcotics. explain why and how you came to that conclusion and what you think the effect of the strategy is. that conclusion
based upon what we have seen out there and what i was told by people when i go out there. i go every quarter. part of the problem we see is that we may have some strategy, very good strategy on paper, how are they going to be worked and implemented? you see the results. if our goal was to decrease the production of opium, looked at in that stat. we have failed. if our goal was to cut down on the amount of money going to the taliban, we failed. we have failed in all of those missions with a lot more dhsurces and dea agents and agents and more people doing money-laundering the fan is proposed now under the transition planning by the state
department. our question is, how are you going to do more with less? if you have failed up to now with a 97 agents, with the ability to travel around most of the country and all the military, how we you do better is to mark -- better? we are doing a major audit at the request of a number of senators to see what works and does not. what we were told -- what was driving the train on other issues was the number. your 20 or 30 or 40 agents, a program fitted. that is not to do transition planning. >> thank you. i'm going to ask mr. capra something outside of the issue of this committee but related to
drugs. officialhe senior dea in charge of enforcement. thatepartment announced they were not going to enforce some drug laws. some states voted to have other types of marijuana policy and a lot of this is finding its way into my state of iowa. even though state a loss said it cannot happen -- a state laws say it cannot happen. what is your view? >> we put out a policy where eightutors would consider different factors in prosecuting cases relative to marijuana. it is a schedule one controlled substance and in the legal -- is illegal. i am glad you asked. i have to say this.
27 years as a dea agent. 34 years in federal government. father of six great kids and a wife. i've been serving the country since i was 18 years old. i have to tell you this. i certainly great state of california for nine years as an agent. i went with you to california when you establish an office. i must tell you this. going down the path, the legalization in this country is reckless and irresponsible. the department has set up factors and i get to that. i am talking about the long-term impact the legalization and the united states. it scares us. the education. law enforcement is where read what is going to happen. isis worried about what
going to happen. in every part of the world where this experiment has tried it has failed time and time again. the voters have decided to do this. it'll impact to the state, surrounded states. has turned around and done a lot of great things. i wish some people would take example of what has happened. there are more dispensaries in a different than starbucks -- in a different than starbucks. denver than starbucks. -- >> you are saying it should be enforced? >> the idea that some people and it is good as a nation and good for the next generation is wrong. -- ita bad thing for stop is a bad thing.
us 10 are going to ask years from now, how did we get to where we are getting? add to international drug enforcement conference held in moscow which we have every year, we partner with the new partners . last year we were in moscow, 100 different nations. we are sitting there. meeting with every bite whether political leaders or law enforcement leaders. almost everyone looked at us and said, why are you doing this but mark -- this? i have no answer for them. i do not have an answer. i do not. working in washington as a young told me weor agents can never work with columbia. 27 years later, we have all
germans going to columbia for going tolgerians columbia for best practices. excitement,for my but this is a bad experiment. a bad, bad experiment and it will cost the united states in terms of social cost and criminality. you need to know this. we went to bakersfield. medical marijuana dispensary as a front to launder meth. bakersfieldo dea, and miami. i am worried about the more states it happens too. you will demand from he and he dea, how would you stop that? dea and law that
enforcement offices around the world are interested of building a bomb in a basement. we are not. we have never been. that's not the federal government's problem. as a mom and dad problem. the i am interested in trafficking groups that want bong.to be puffing on a that is what they want. sometimes get lost. great things have been done in the united states. traumatic -- tremendous things. you asked the question which is not been answered. not addressed. ma'am, i know you have. going down this road. giving out factors on how to prosecute cases. people thought we were going
after smalltime traffickers. i've been at the dea for 27 years. i have never arrest and added. we do not have time for this. i apologize -- >> three merck questions for answering and writing. -- three more questions for answering and writing. thank you. >> thank you. his statement. i see frustration. i tend to agree. i oppose the legalization of marijuana in california with most law enforcement. whether it will be back to next time, i have no clue. i believe it is the wrong thing to do socially. i believe that it is a gateway drug.
i believe that it leads to other things. the fronting for methamphetamines is one of them. it is one thing to do it with a doctors prescription to relief pain in a terminally ill situation. i understand that. there are certain kinds of marijuana that can be used to -- medically we are seeing that happen. but to say that it should be used socially on an ongoing and robust basis, your analogy that there are more marijuana stores in denver than starbucks is an interesting one. one person was brought back and tried. the afghan government does not have extradition treaties with us. >> yes, ma'am.
>> any big traffickers brought accidents by dea? by the dea?ack >> we have not had anyone turned over to us since then. >> any that have been hit by dea since then? >> yes. >> how many? >> we are still actively involved in those. >> i would like to see that. i believe we are pulling out too fast. i believe that the taliban and is waiting. i believe that they now control insidetial land afghanistan. that is what the circle indicates to me that you are not safe to go except in those blue zones. correct a wrong? -- or wrong? >> i agree.
that in itself is a message. government is waiting. it we pull out of the question comes of how long afghanistan military, itain its would look back at that for certain aircraft as to whether there is going to be the ability in the future to handle that aircraft. the you tried to arrest -- '10 were very active. they were busting labs and ing people up. it seems to have stopped. increase ins that drug production over one year. >> go ahead.
without a doubt, we have challenges when we drawback. operate their in the capacity that we have because of their state dod funding. we'll have funding for 13 positions. itember that you mentioned -- we agree with you 100%. our core mission is to extend the will of law and build those institutions agree and stand up much like we did -- that is wide use the term earlier when we talked about -- the village of the law enforcement for counter narcotics is critical. dea doesn't do the interdiction we try topies, what
do is have encountered in aquatic strategy by having a judicial wire intercept program. we have since then done a number of operations, but not to the tempo that we used to do because you need security forces. you need to have medical evac. there is a challenge. at the same time, we have continued to go after major trafficking organizations in that arena. we do not have a traditions ictions lately.d indo have people indicted the southern district of new york that are there that we have not arrested yet. we continue to do indictments. rest assured, we continue to do bilateral investigations.
you have mentioned it in your paper. wasre this began, there original -- regional approaches. should the u.s. pull out completely? >> let me stop you for a minute. a colleague of mine thought this cooperatehe dea could with iran and we could have mutual efforts. concernedns are very about the opiate use and store the russians. is there a possibility in your view of the game some kind of ,oalition between us afghanistan, the iranians, and the russians? >> we are working with the russians already. with iranians,
people are on the ground with permission from state to have discussions with some of the iranians in the past. discussions have been limited before. >> what about just dea doing that? >> with iranians? >> yeah. >> we would take guidance from the department and state. one of the things you know is that anywhere around the globe as a law enforcement officer, we are able to sometimes breach -- people are worried about the u.s. presence. we look at it as we are the dope cops. we pride ourselves in relationships. even in surrounding countries, we have been able to do those things. we are more than willing to continue to do that. again, i do not want you to think that these things are not occurring. >> this is just my view. , it isonversations
believed that it had to be run by the local government, but there is also a shadow government. these governors get killed by the taliban. -- can then comes food zone concept work today? that.l take a bite out of the answer is, yes. no row gram or strategy is so perfect that it does not require adjustment for modification. a way that we try to implement the food zone which in the area that we concentrate that efforts produces exceptional results and 80% reduction in opium poppy cultivation in that targeted area. we have learned from the experience. the area not targeted saw
additional growth. we saw poppies blooming in the desert. it is producing at a far lower -- we but nevertheless have to take that into account. we had to take into account that if you look at the map of afghanistan, different provinces are producing more or less opium poppy. we have to have a food zone program that is sufficiently flexible that we can tear it up and wind it down and do something else and think about having something in three years that has that degree of fix ability to it. in addition, we have to accept the fact that we do not have unlimited resources. all of theet read pages of the fiscal year it hundred 14 appropriations bill, the many paged-
appropriations bill, but i predict that the resources made for purposes of afghanistan are probably moving in a downward direction. from my perspective, where do i prioritize? how much priority ui give to -- hiresive to for which a b -- for which you be the highest priority? i should get idolaters up where the dea effort. goes into the food zone? at the end of the day, this is the problem we are working with your i wish i could tell you it is a simple matter. chronologyklist or or sequence into it. do that as well as i even places where it has worked, thailand, pakistan, turkey, and
most recently columbia, that is not the way it ends up. >> i happen to have talked with the london a few days ago. colombian -- a few days ago. they were able to turn around some of the membership. they say it is down to something like 35,000. it has been a prodigious experience and a learning experience. now the colombians are providing information to other countries on how to carry out this kind of effort. you go quarterly. you see the change. out theoing to pull taliban. -- we are going to pull out. the taliban will come out of their holes and begin their
activities again. what do you think that we should do? chairman, i usually due process and not policy. >> try it. you might like it. for aemember working senator on issues dealing with , and it wasru called icecap or something like that. >> snow cap. >> i remember we were debating -- senatorgive charles was pushing for that. you see the program has changed. say one thing? we should caution that every country is different. comparing columbia to afghanistan is fraught with potential problems.
>> i didn't intend to do that. clumpy was a massive effort. -- columbia was a massive effort. >> absolutely. it will not happen overnight. what we need to do is we need to sit down. we need to find out what worked and what didn't work. unfortunately, we have been there for 12 years. you'd hope someone had done that. designing a lan and deciding how plan andagents -- a deciding how many dea agents are there, i think we need to i doubt what worked and what didn't work. >> i think you have to find a substitute for the poppy. that is hard to do. it is hard to do with farm products. the suggestion is if you can do
it by beginning small businesses that have some kind of reduction of make some sense that people can live by instead of a poppy, maybe that makes sense. >> you are correct. you're to look at programs that are sustainable. buffoon -- production is up. that is a concern that we have about any row gram if the afghans cannot sustain it. -- program if the afghans cannot sustain it. the big change in columbia is when they expressed and showed that they have the political will to take on the traffickers. you have to have that will. we have a country that does not appear to have the political will. it can be because of the enormous corruption that has occurred because of the narcotraffickers.
go, butually have to let me thank everyone. i think it is worth wrestling with this because like it or not, there will be a large element of blame placed on us. 2014, we will be in the process of pulling out. we will be very interested if you could give it some thought to myme back and talk cochairman and myself. we are happy to do that. if you want to write us something that we might be able to incorporate, we are looking for ideas. thank you for caring and for what you do. thank you for being here today. this hearing is adjourned. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by
-- ofolf of the national a national association joins us. we also take your comments beginning live at 7 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> tomorrow at 11 a.m. eastern, remarks from comedian and political pundit, evan sayet. here is a brief portion from the event. is the mainstream media, has it gotten every major story of our lifetime not just wrong, but as wrong as wrong can be? to prove by begin pointing out one of the good guys. we have an